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Financial Firm Bankruptcies, International Stock Markets and Investor 
Sentiment 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We consider bankruptcy announcements of large financial institutions in the US and examine their 
impact on an international sample of 66 stock market indices. Employing an event-study 
methodology, we find that stock markets exhibit strong adverse reaction in the aftermath of such 
announcements. Further, we develop a Surprise measure, based on the country-level investor 
sentiment, and find that stock markets in negatively surprised countries respond quickly, by 
sustaining significantly larger declines in the first three trading days following the announcements. 
Finally, we examine the reaction of stock markets, conditional on the economic classification of 
their home countries, and find that stock markets in developing (developed) economies are 
associated with substantially larger (smaller) economic losses.  
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1. Introduction 
   It is widely accepted that large financial firm bankruptcies generate high uncertainty among 
investors and affect the wider economy (Aharony and Swary, 1983). The most pronounced recent 
example is the collapse of the Lehman Brothers Investment Bank, ten years ago. With an aggregate 
value of assets exceeding 600 billion USD at the time of the announcement, the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy was the largest in history and is associated with the onset of the Global Financial Crisis 
in 2008. That set aside, there are also other adverse effects related to financial firm bankruptcies 
such as contagion effects in the stock prices of competitors (Gay et al., 1991; Aharony and Swary, 
1996; Yamori, 1999; Helwege and Zhang, 2016) and the stock prices of firms with exposure in the 
failing financial institutions (Chakrabarty and Zhang, 2012; Fernando et al., 2012). Overall, there 
is evidence to support the view that stock prices of corporations related to financial firms filing for 
bankruptcy decline following the announcement. 
   This paper explores an area of research which, to the best of our knowledge, is novel. In 
particular, we look to identify an “international” contagion effect, following bankruptcy 
announcements of large financial institutions in the US. There are several reasons to expect a 
negative reaction of the international stock markets after such announcements. First, the US is one 
of the strongest, most resilient and probably the most influential country in the world and thus 
plays an important role in affecting global stock markets (Bathia et al., 2016). Second, 
bankruptcies, and particularly those where the involved entity is a large financial institution, are 
events which can increase the systemic risk in the entire economy of a nation, group of countries, 
and the world. Hence, large shocks stemming from strong economies (such as the US) are a signal 
of an upcoming negative economic outlook. When this happens, investors engage in risk 
management (i.e. sell equity to buy safer securities), generating a negative reaction in stock market 
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prices. Thus, there is an “information contagion effect”, where the disseminating of “bad” 
information leads investors to revise their future expectations downwards (Giesecke, 2004; Collin-
Dufresne et al., 2010).1 Finally, prior literature has documented that “shocks” generated from the 
US affect international markets. For instance, Tandon and Urich (1987) show that macroeconomic 
announcements from the US, related to money supply and inflation, affect the Eurocurrency 
interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and gold prices. Similar evidence has also been found by 
Cornell (1982) among others. In addition, Jones and Olson (2015) find that US uncertainty shocks 
induce significant declines in foreign exports and interest rates, and cause foreign currencies to 
appreciate relative to the dollar. Moreover, Becker et al. (1995) find that UK equities respond 
within half an hour following US macroeconomic releases, suggesting that investors react to public 
information originating from the United States.  
   The key contribution of this paper is that we investigate the post-US bankruptcy announcement 
reaction in an international sample of stock market indices. Our empirical evidence suggests that, 
following the announcements, stock markets exhibit strong negative reaction without signs of 
reversal for at least 10 trading days post-announcement. 
   Our second contribution is the consideration of the country-level investor sentiment to account 
for possible variations in the effects that bankruptcy announcements can impose on the feelings 
and mood of investors. In particular, we investigate the extent of stock markets’ reactions, with 
respect to the fluctuations in investor sentiment, generated by bankruptcy announcements from 
                                                 
1 Another mechanism through which a financial bankruptcy may cause stock prices to fall is the “counterparty risk 
effect”. In this case, the bankruptcy of the financial institution causes distress to those firms linked with the failing 
institution (Davis and Lo, 2001). However, this is most likely to affect the stock index of the local market than the 
stock indices around the globe. Ultimately, we argue that the results of our paper are explained by the “information 
contagion effect”. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247183 
5 
 
large financial firms in the US. 2 We posit that international stock markets do not respond similarly 
in the aftermath of US bankruptcy announcements but, rather, the degree of reaction depends on 
how international investors perceive/evaluate the bankruptcy announcements or, equivalently, 
how investor sentiment changes after the announcements. We expect, for example, that economies 
maintaining strong trading and economic bonds with the US or economies with increased 
sensitivity to external shocks will exhibit larger declines in investor sentiment, following large 
financial firm bankruptcy announcements from the US.3 Subsequently, we expect the stock 
markets in economies with large negative changes in the investor sentiment to exhibit a greater 
negative reaction to bankruptcy announcements. Thus, we seek to more accurately capture stock 
market reaction by taking investor sentiment into consideration. To this end, we employ the 
Marketpsych Indices from Thomson Reuters which measure the country-level investor sentiment 
and develop a measure for the post-announcement change in investor sentiment. Our findings 
suggest that stock markets in countries with higher decline in the post-announcement investor 
sentiment (i.e. countries exhibiting a Negative Surprise) respond quickly to the announcements 
and sustain significantly larger economic losses, in the first three trading days after the event.  
    Finally, we examine the effect of large US financial firm bankruptcy announcements on stock 
markets of developed and developing economies. Prior literature finds that developing markets are 
more vulnerable to external shocks. For instance, Soydemir (2000) finds that shocks generated in 
the US do affect emerging stock markets, and the effect lasts longer relative to the effect of such 
                                                 
2 This is based on the argument that sentiment affects stock prices (see Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Tetlock, 2007; 
Schmeling, 2009 and Bathia et al., 2016, among others). 
3 By investigating this issue a little bit further, we find that the countries which experience a drop in the sentiment 
most of the times, are those where US is a major export partner. For instance, Colombia sends about 1/3 of its exports 
to US and thus, shocks generated from US possibly affects investor sentiment in Colombia negatively. However, there 
would possibly be other explanations which is beyond the scope of the present paper. It would be interesting for future 
research to shed light on the reasons why several countries experience a drop in the sentiment.    
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shocks in developed stock markets. Furthermore, Coudert et al. (2015) find that financial shocks 
generated in developed economies can affect stock markets in emerging economies. Consistent 
with prior studies, we find that stock markets in developing countries exhibit more negative 
reactions relative to the case of developed countries. 
    The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the data, in section 
3, we present the methodology.  We discuss the results in section 4 and conclude in section 5. 
2. Data 
2.1. Sample of Bankruptcies 
   We collect bankruptcy announcements from BankruptcyData, a comprehensive database 
containing corporate bankruptcy and distressed company information in the US dating back to the 
1970s. The database, among others, reports a list with the 20 largest financial bankruptcies in the 
US, with aggregate assets above US$15 billion. We increase our sample by choosing bankruptcy 
announcements of financial institutions with aggregate assets exceeding US$10 billion at the time 
of the announcement. We search for financial bankruptcies that occurred up to April 2016 when 
our sample of TRMI (Sentiment) data ends. Overall, our sample comprises 27 bankruptcy 
announcements by US financial institutions over the period 1988-2012. Additional details are 
provided in Table 1.    
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
2.2. Equity Data 
    We collect equity data of local stock market indices from Thomson DataStream. In total, we use 
67 equity return indices that belong to the DataStream World Stock Market Index “TOTMKWD”, 
of which 66 are local (country-level) indices and the last is the world market index. Note that we 
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report all indices in US dollars to eliminate noise that may come from foreign exchange rates 
(Pukthuanthong and Roll, 2009). The list of the 66 countries with equity data is provided in Table 
2 and includes additional information, such as the economic classification of countries as 
developing or developed.4  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
2.3. Thomson Reuters Sentiment Index and Surprise    
   For the purpose of this study, we consider the Thomson Reuters Marketpsych family of Indices 
(henceforth TRMI), available since the 1st of January 1998. The TRMI translate the volume, tone 
and specific word choices of articles, news stories and social media posts into practicable 
information which, among other uses, can measure the overall sentiment, optimism, joy, trust and 
fear with respect to companies, asset classes, and countries. In particular, the TRMI cover 
12,000+ companies operating in more than 75 countries, 36 commodities and energy subjects, 45 
currencies and 187 countries, among others. These indices are compiled based on proprietary 
algorithms developed by Thomson Reuters in collaboration with Marketpsych LLC and are 
available on a real-time basis and over a 24-hour rolling window.5   
   We adopt the TRMI because they come with several advantages. First, we argue that TRMI are 
more efficient in measuring the ‘real’ sentiment across the countries compared to other textual 
analysis-based sentiment metrics; the former use data from a larger number of international and 
social media news based on distinct dictionaries for traditional media and social media sources 
(Huang et al., 2018). Second, the same algorithms are used to generate TRMI across companies, 
                                                 
4 To classify countries as developing and developed, we follow the MSCI market classification guide of 2018: 
https://www.msci.com/market-classification. 
5 For further information on the TRMI indices, see https://www.marketpsych.com    
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asset classes and countries, suggesting that the indices are homogeneous/comparable among those 
entities and do not need further processing or adjusting before use. Third, TRMI cover a broader 
range of countries compared to the traditional non-textual analysis-based sentiment measures 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Baker and Wurgler, 2007; Yu and Yuan, 2011; Baker, Wurgler and 
Yuan, 2012; Huang et al., 2015). Finally, traditional sentiment measures use stock market trading 
data which are not readily available for the cross-section of the countries we use in this study. 
   We use the overall per-country sentiment which covers 61 (out of 66) countries for which we 
have equity data.6 The TRMI Sentiment classifies and then maps news stories on a continuous 
scale between -1 and +1, from the most negative to the most positive. In the context of the present 
paper, we use TRMI Sentiment to proxy for investor sentiment at local country-level and, from 
this point onwards, we use the two terms interchangeably.  
   To account for the change in investor sentiment post-announcement, we construct a Negative 
Surprise Indicator (NSI) which takes the values 0 and 1, based on the direction of change in the 
TRMI Sentiment.7 This is a 3-step procedure: First, we estimate the abnormal sentiments on days 
0 and +1, by subtracting the average pre-announcement sentiment (over trading days -10 to -2) 
from the raw sentiment, to assess how the sentiment changes in the post-announcement period, 
relative to a normal day. Second, we calculate the Cumulative Abnormal Sentiment (CAS), by 
adding the abnormal sentiments on days 0 and +1.  This is to measure the cumulative effect of 
the sentiment during the first two trading days post-announcement. Third, for countries with 
negative CAS, we assume a Negative Surprise (NSI=1) and when CAS is non-negative, we 
assume a Positive Surprise (NSI=0).  
                                                 
6 With the exception of Cyprus, Croatia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Luxembourg. 
7 For countries without TRMI data and for events occurring before 1998, when TRMI data were introduced for the 
first time, NSI is not available. 
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3. Methodology 
   We generate our results using a short-horizon event-study analysis, a method regarded as 
straightforward and trouble-free (Kothari and Warner, 2007). In order to estimate robust results, 
we adapt the methodology in Michaelides et al. (2015) to the standards of this paper. 
   First, we estimate the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) using country stock market returns 
as the dependent variable and the world returns as the independent variable. We choose the 
estimation period to cover the interval of (-100, -11) trading days, relative to event day 0.8 
Specifically, we estimate the following equation.  
𝑹𝒊𝒕𝒋 = 𝒂𝒊𝒋 + 𝜷𝒊𝒋𝑹𝑾𝒕𝒋 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕𝒋     𝑠. 𝑡.     −100 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ −11. (1) 
   Ritj is the stock market return of country “i”, at day “t”, relative to the event “j”. RWtj is the return 
of the world index at day “t”, relative to the event “j” (𝑖 = 1,2, … . ,66 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 = 1,2, … . ,27). Next, 
we use the estimated coefficients from Equation (1) to calculate abnormal returns (ARs) in the 
event window (-10, +10). We define abnormal returns (ARitj) as the difference of actual (raw) and 
expected returns. 
𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕𝒋 = 𝑹𝒊𝒕𝒋 − ?̂?𝒊𝒋 − ?̂?𝒊𝒋𝑹𝑾𝒕𝒋     𝑠. 𝑡.     −10 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ +10. (2) 
   We obtain cumulative abnormal return (CARij) over the interval (t1, t2), as follows. 
       𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋[𝒕𝟏, 𝒕𝟐] = 𝑨𝑹𝒊,𝒕𝟏,𝒋 + ⋯ +𝑨𝑹𝒊,𝒕𝟐,𝒋     𝑠. 𝑡.     −10 ≤ 𝑡1 ≤ 𝑡2 ≤ +10. (3) 
 
                                                 
8 Event day 0 is the actual date of the bankruptcy incident, if a working day, or the first working day following the 
actual day of the incident, if not a working day. 
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   Then we estimate the equally weighted average (across all event-country observations) 
cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) over the same interval, as follows. 
𝑨𝑪𝑨𝑹[𝒕𝟏, 𝒕𝟐] =
𝟏
𝟏𝟕𝟖𝟐
∑ ∑ 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(𝒕𝟏, 𝒕𝟐) 
𝟐𝟕
𝒋=𝟏
𝟔𝟔
𝒊=𝟏      𝑠. 𝑡.     −10 ≤ 𝑡1 ≤ 𝑡2 ≤ +10. (4) 
   We further use test statistics that account for event-induced variance, standardizing abnormal 
returns in the event window. The method, proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991), takes ARs in the 
event window (Equation (2)) and divides them by the time series standard deviation of the residuals 
(abnormal returns) from the estimation period (-100, -11). The steps we follow to estimate the 
standardized abnormal returns (SARs hereafter) are provided in Equations (5) - (7).    
𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
𝟏
𝟗𝟎
∑ 𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋𝒕
−𝟏𝟏
𝒕=−𝟏𝟎𝟎
 (5) 
𝒔𝒊𝒋̅̅ ̅ = √
𝟏
𝟖𝟗
∑ (𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋𝒕 − 𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )𝟐
−𝟏𝟏
𝒕=−𝟏𝟎𝟎
 (6) 
𝑺𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕𝒋 =
𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕𝒋
𝒔𝒊𝒋̅̅̅̅
     𝑠. 𝑡.      − 10 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ +10. (7) 
   Finally, the test statistic of Boehmer et al. (1991) is given in Equation (8). 
𝑻𝑩𝑴𝑷 = √𝟏𝟕𝟖𝟐
𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑹𝒕
𝒔
     𝑠. 𝑡.      − 10 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ +10.   (8) 
   The formula used to estimate Average Standardized Abnormal Returns (ASARs), the numerator 
of TBMP, is provided below. 
𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑹𝒕 =
𝟏
𝟏𝟕𝟖𝟐
∑ ∑ 𝑺𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕𝒋
𝟐𝟕
𝒋=𝟏
𝟔𝟔
𝒊=𝟏      𝑠. 𝑡.      − 10 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ +10. (9) 
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   The denominator of TBMP is estimated as follows. 
𝒔 = √
𝟏
𝟏𝟕𝟖𝟏
∑ ∑ (𝑺𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕𝒋
𝟐𝟕
𝒋=𝟏 − 𝑨𝑺𝑨𝑹𝒕)
𝟐𝟔𝟔
𝒊=𝟏      𝑠. 𝑡.      − 10 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ +10. (10) 
   Finally, we estimate the test statistic of Kolari and Pynnonen (2010), which is an expansion of 
the Boehmer et al. (1991) test statistic.9 The difference is that the KP statistic also takes into 
account the cross-sectional correlation of the residuals in the estimation period. It is estimated as 
follows. 
𝑻𝑲𝑷 = 𝑻𝑩𝑴𝑷√
𝟏−?̅?
𝟏+(𝟏𝟕𝟖𝟏)?̅?
. (11) 
   The coefficient ?̅? is the average sample cross-correlation of the estimation period residuals. 
Furthermore, the test statistics (Equations (8) and (11)) are estimated by assuming that the 
abnormal returns (Equation (2)) are independent and identically distributed random variables 
which follow the normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ2.  As such, the test statistics 
are assumed to asymptotically have the standard normal distribution, provided that the number of 
event-country observations on a given day t (relative to the event day 0) is sufficiently large. 
4. Results 
   In this section, we discuss our results. First, we consider the collective effect of all 27 bankruptcy 
announcements on stock market indices (Overall case). Second, we consider the effect of the 20 
post-1998 bankruptcy announcements, while differentiating stock market indices into two groups 
based on the direction of post-announcement change in investor sentiment (Surprise case). Third, 
                                                 
9 In the tables of results, we only report the test statistics of Kolari and Pynnonen (2010). The test statistics of Boehmer 
et al. (1991) are not tabulated but can be provided upon request.  
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we consider the effect of all 27 bankruptcy announcements on stock market indices while taking 
into consideration the economic classification of the home country (Country classification case). 
4.1. Overall and Surprise  
   Figure 1 presents the plots of Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACARs) for the Overall 
and Surprise cases. It further shows a plot of ACARs around a set of randomly selected dates 
(matching the number and time span of the bankruptcy announcements in Table 1) for comparison 
purposes. The Overall case exhibits large adverse stock market reaction, with the decline being 
most pronounced during the first three trading days post-announcement but with a more gradual 
accumulation of the economic losses up to trading day 10, post-announcement. Stock markets in 
negatively surprised countries experience steeper and larger declines, which are particularly 
evident in the first three trading days following the announcement. Finally, positively surprised 
countries demonstrate a delayed reaction since, in the first four trading days post-announcement, 
stock market indices do not show a clear downward trend. Nevertheless, on trading day five post-
announcement, the indices start exhibiting sharp declines and, by day 10, the losses are on a par 
with those of negatively surprised countries. We believe that positive concurrent good news, as 
documented by positive change in investor sentiment (i.e. Positive Surprise), temporarily cover 
the negative effect of bankruptcy news in the first four trading days following bankruptcy 
announcements. After that time (i.e. from trading day five onwards), stock markets start declining, 
adjusting the level of prices to reflect the content of the negative (from the bankruptcy 
announcement) news. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
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   Table 3 presents the results for the Overall and Surprise cases. In the Overall case, several time 
windows, the  [0,+1], [0,+2], [0,+3] and [0,+5], exhibit significant economic losses with their 
respective ACARs estimated at -0.331%, -0.285%, -0.549% and -0.445%. These results suggest 
that international stock markets react immediately to large US financial institutions’ bankruptcy 
announcements. Several other time windows are also statistically significant, the [+1,+3], [+1,+5], 
[+2,+10], [+3,+10,] and [+5,+10], with ACARs estimated at -0.394%, -0.290%, -0.409%, -0.455% 
and -0.384%,  respectively. These additional results indicate that significant economic losses occur 
not only in the first days following the announcements, but also later. 
   A more interesting result is documented in the Negative Surprise case. We find that stock 
markets in negatively surprised countries react more strongly to US bankruptcy announcements, 
generating large negative ACARs. Specifically, the ACARs in time windows [0,+1], [0,+2], [0,+3] 
and [0,+5], are statistically significant, amounting for -0.537%, -0.482%, -0.868% and -0.584%, 
respectively. Other time windows, for instance [+1,+2], [+1,+3], [+2,+10], [+3,+10] and [+5,+10], 
are also significant with the respective ACARS estimated at -0.224%, -0.611%, -0.491%, -0.547% 
and -0.451%. 
   In contrast, countries with Positive Surprise do not exhibit an immediate response in their stock 
market indices since the event windows [0,+1], [0,+2] and [0, +3], which immediately follow the 
announcement, have insignificant ACARs. Several other windows though, such as [+1,+5], 
[+2,+10], [+3,+10,] and [+5,+10], are significant, with the corresponding ACARs estimated at   -
0.222%, -0.675%, -0.731% and -0.779%, respectively, suggesting a delay in stock market reaction 
in Positive Surprise countries. Note that for the positively surprised countries, the negative reaction 
is more pronounced towards the end of the 10-trading-day post-announcement period. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
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4.2. Country Classification  
   Figure 2 shows the plots of ACARs for the Country Classification case. It further shows the plots 
of ACARs for the Overall case around a set of randomly selected dates (i.e. Placebo: matching the 
number and time span of the bankruptcy announcements in Table 1) for comparison purposes. The 
graph suggests that most of the effect in the Overall case is caused by the adverse reaction in stock 
markets of developing countries, which decline substantially following the announcement date. 
Stock markets in developed countries are affected too but the effect is considerably milder and 
shorter-lived.      
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
   Table 4 presents results of ACARs for several event windows for the Overall and Country 
Classification cases. Starting with developing countries, we document strong adverse stock market 
reaction following the date of announcement. In particular, the windows [0, +1], [0, +2], [0, +3], 
[0, +5], [+1, +3], [+1, +5], [+2, +10], [+3, +10] and [+5, +10] are associated with statistically 
significant ACARs, estimated at -0.367%, -0.283%, -0.68%, -0.515%, -0.506%, -0.689%, -0.773% 
and -0.668%, respectively. Results suggest that, in developing countries, the bankruptcy news 
effect is long-lived, persisting for at least 10 trading days in the post-announcement period. Stock 
markets in developed countries are also affected, but to a much lesser degree. In this case, the 
windows [0,+1], [0,+2], [0,+3] and [0,+5] are associated with significant ACARs, estimated at -
0.277%, -0.286%, -0.352%  and -0.341%, respectively. These results are consistent with prior 
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studies which suggest that external shocks originating in developed economies adversely affect 
emerging (i.e. developing) economies (Soydemir, 2000; Coudert et al., 2015).10  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
5. Robustness Tests 
5.1. Testing the Sample and Methodology 
   We evaluate the robustness of our sample of events and methodology by conducting several 
additional tests. First, since all bankruptcy announcements were issued by US-based financial 
institutions, we remove the US from the sample of countries with equity data, in order to examine 
the effect of these announcements in non-US economies. The results remain qualitatively 
unaffected, albeit slightly stronger. Upon closer inspection of the results, we find that in the US 
alone, the stock market index exhibits negative (positive) abnormal returns before (after) the 
bankruptcy announcements (results untabulated). A possible interpretation of this result is that US 
investors anticipate bankruptcies of large US financial institutions, perceiving them as being 
systemic events that could possibly affect all stocks. Therefore, they sell off their equity holdings 
prior to the date of official announcement (thus the index drops) and reallocate to stock holdings 
several days later, following the announcement, thereby generating a reversion of the index.11  
   Next, from the sample of bankruptcy announcements, we exclude the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers Investment Bank, the largest bankruptcy in our sample, because the magnitude of this 
case can potentially skew the results. In this instance, the results remain qualitatively unaffected. 
                                                 
10 We also document a pre-announcement event window (-10, -1) with an associated positive ACAR of 0.468% in the 
case of developed countries which we attribute to (other) positive news prior to the date of bankruptcy announcements. 
11 Other plausible interpretations of this result are also possible and although it would be interesting to investigate this 
matter further, it is beyond the scope of this paper. Hence, we leave this topic open for future research. 
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We further report results after excluding bankruptcy announcements cases of Very Large (VL) 
financial institutions, those of Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual combined (the first and 
second largest bankruptcies in our sample).12 Then, we repeat the test (i.e. we exclude VL 
bankruptcies) but this time, we also exclude equity data from the US. In all cases, the results remain 
statistically and economically significant, albeit slightly weaker than the Overall case.  
   Finally, we conduct a placebo test, by using 27 randomly selected dates (matching the number 
and time span of the sample of announcements in Table 1) and find that our methodology generates 
ACARs that are indistinguishable from zero (results untabulated).  
   We report the robustness test results in Table 5. Overall, our results are robust to the exclusion 
of the US from the sample of stock market indices and the exclusion of VL bankruptcies (i.e. 
Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual) from the sample of events. Finally, our methodology 
is robust to the placebo test.   
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
5.2. Testing an Alternative Measure for Surprise 
   In order to test the robustness of the Negative Surprise Indicator (NSI), which we introduce in 
Section 2.3, we construct an alternative indicator based on the post-event Cumulative Difference 
in Sentiment (CDS). This is also based on a 3-step procedure: First, we estimate the difference in 
sentiments (DS) on days 0 and +1, defined as DSt = Sentimentt – Sentimentt-1. Second we sum the 
DS of days 0 and +1 to get the CDS. Third, when the CDS of a country is negative we assume a 
Negative Surprise (NSI#2=1). If CDS is non-negative, we assume a Positive Surprise (NSI#2=0). 
                                                 
12 The combined aggregate value of assets of Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual at the time of the 
announcement exceeds USD1 trillion and accounts for more than 60% of the combined value of assets of all 27 
bankruptcies that we consider in this paper. 
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Table 6 contains results from the event-study methodology for the Overall and Surprise cases, 
similar to Table 3, but using the alternative measure for Surprise (NSI#2). Overall, the results in 
Table 6 are comparable to those of Table 3, which we interpret as a validation of the robustness 
for our main Surprise measure.  
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
5.3. Evaluating Sentiment and Surprise with Regression Analysis 
   For our final set of robustness tests we employ regression analysis. First, we regress the 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns on Cumulative Abnormal Sentiments (and the Cumulative 
Difference in Sentiments in a separate regression), reporting results in Table 7. We account for the 
heterogeneity of events and countries via indicator variables and for the heteroscedasticity of error 
terms by using White-Huber standard errors. We find that the estimated coefficient of Cumulative 
Abnormal Sentiment is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that when 
investor sentiment drops following bankruptcy announcements, international stock markets 
experience lower returns. Similar inference can be drawn for the estimated coefficient of CDS. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
   Second, we regress CAR (0, 1), CAR (0, 3) and CAR (0, 5) on our main and alternative Surprise 
measures (NSI and NSI#2) and report results in Table 8.13 The estimated coefficients for NSI and 
NSI#2 are economically and statistically significant across all cases. Furthermore, the negative 
                                                 
13 The steps followed to estimate CAR (0, X) are given by Equations (1) – (3). The steps followed to construct NSI 
and NSI#2 are described in Sections 2.3 and 5.2, respectively. 
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coefficients suggest that Negative Surprises (i.e. NSI=1 & NSI#2=1) are associated with larger 
economic losses in the post-announcement period, consistent with our event-study findings.  
   Overall, we provide robust evidence that the Sentiment (and our main Surprise measure) is 
important in determining the adverse effect of large US financial firm bankruptcy announcements 
on international stock market returns.   
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
6. Conclusions 
   This study considers 27 bankruptcy announcements by large financial institutions in the US and 
examines their impact on an international sample of 66 stock market indices. We employ an event-
study methodology and find that stock markets exhibit strong adverse reaction, following the 
announcements. The adverse reaction is particularly evident in the first three trading days post-
announcement but with losses accumulating for at least 10 trading days (two calendar weeks) in 
the aftermath, without signs of reversal.  
   Further, we classify countries by their level of Surprise, determined by the change in the country-
level investor sentiment, in the aftermath of bankruptcy announcements, and find that negatively 
surprised countries are associated with more pronounced stock market declines in the first few 
days following the event. In cases of Positive Surprise, the economic losses of stock markets start 
materializing on trading day five post-announcement, suggesting that other concurrently running 
local good news (irrelevant to the bankruptcy) temporarily mask the negative effect of the 
bankruptcy news. These results lend support to the argument that, under certain circumstances, 
investor sentiment can explain the reaction of international stock markets to unexpected exogenous 
shocks.  
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   Finally, we consider the economic classification of countries (Developing vs Developed) and 
show that stock markets in developing economies sustain significantly larger and more persistent 
losses. This result supports the view that stock markets in developing economies have increased 
sensitivity to “shocks” originating from the US, probably due to the larger degree of dependency 
of those economies on the US economy.  
   Our results and methodology are robust to several settings. For instance, results remain 
qualitatively unchanged after removing the US from the sample of countries with equity data and 
only slightly change (retaining their significance and direction) after removing the collapse of very 
large financial firms (i.e. the Lehman Brothers Investment Bank and Washington Mutual) from 
the sample of bankruptcy announcements.  Finally, our methodology generates insignificant 
abnormal returns to the placebo (random dates) test. 
   For the future, it would be interesting to expand this study by considering additional country 
characteristics and how these characteristics can affect the reaction of international stock market 
indices after bankruptcy announcements. Further, the inclusion of bankruptcies from non-financial 
institutions and bankruptcy announcements from corporations not based in the US would be an 
interesting addition to the analysis. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Financial Firm Bankruptcies 
This table lists the 27 largest bankruptcy announcements (Chapter 7 or Chapter 11) of financial 
institutions in the US, over the period 1988-2012. Assets are in billion USD and represent the 
estimated aggregate value of assets the institutions were holding when they filed for bankruptcy.   
a/a Company 
Date of 
Announcement 
Assets  
(in billion $) 
1 Financial Corp of America 09/09/1988 33.9 
2 Mcorp 31/03/1989 20.2 
3 Gibraltar Financial Corp 08/02/1990 15 
4 Imperial Corporation of America 28/02/1990 12.3 
5 Bank of New England Corp 07/01/1991 29.8 
6 Southeast Banking Corp 20/09/1991 13.4 
7 HomeFed Corp 22/10/1992 13.9 
8 FINOVA Group Inc, The 07/03/2001 12.1 
9 Refco Inc 17/10/2005 33.3 
10 New Century Financial Corporation 02/04/2007 26.1 
11 American Home Mortgage Investment Corp  06/08/2007 18.8 
12 Fremont General Corporation 18/06/2008 12.9 
13 IndyMac Bancorp Inc 31/07/2008 32.7 
14 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc 15/09/2008 691 
15 Washington Mutual Inc 26/09/2008 327.9 
16 Downey Financial Corp 25/11/2008 13.4 
17 CIT Group 01/11/2009 80.5 
18 General Growth Properties Inc 16/04/2009 29.6 
19 Thornburg Mortgage Inc 01/05/2009 36.5 
20 Bank United Financial Corporation 21/05/2009 15 
21 Colonial BancGroup 25/08/2009 25.8 
22 Guaranty Financial Group Inc 27/08/2009 16.8 
23 Capmark Financial Group Inc 25/10/2009 20.6 
24 UCBH Holdings Inc 24/11/2009 13.5 
25 AmTrustFinancial Corp  30/11/2009 11.7 
26 MF Global Holdings 31/10/2011 40.5 
27 Residential Capital LLC 14/05/2012 15.7 
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Table 2. List of Countries – Stock Market Indices 
This table lists the 66 countries with equity data in our sample. We use the MSCI classification 
guide of 2018 to organize the 66 countries in developing (43) and developed (23) economies. 
Thomson Reuters Markepsych Indices (TRMI) are available for all listed countries, since the 1st 
of January 1998, with the exception of Cyprus, Croatia, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
Ref Country Developed Ref Country Developed 
1 Argentina No 34 Malaysia No 
2 Australia Yes 35 Malta No 
3 Austria Yes 36 Mexico No 
4 Bahrain No 37 Morocco No 
5 Belgium Yes 38 Netherlands Yes 
6 Brazil No 39 New Zealand Yes 
7 Bulgaria No 40 Nigeria No 
8 Canada Yes 41 Norway Yes 
9 Chile No 42 Oman No 
10 China No 43 Pakistan No 
11 Colombia No 44 Peru No 
12 Croatia No 45 Philippines No 
13 Cyprus No 46 Poland No 
14 Czech Republic No 47 Portugal Yes 
15 Denmark Yes 48 Qatar No 
16 Egypt No 49 Romania No 
17 Estonia No 50 Russia No 
18 Finland Yes 51 Singapore Yes 
19 France Yes 52 Slovakia No 
20 Germany Yes 53 Slovenia No 
21 Greece No 54 South Africa No 
22 Hong Kong Yes 55 South Korea No 
23 Hungary No 56 Spain Yes 
24 India No 57 Sri Lanka No 
25 Indonesia No 58 Sweden Yes 
26 Ireland Yes 59 Switzerland Yes 
27 Israel Yes 60 Taiwan No 
28 Italy Yes 61 Thailand No 
29 Japan Yes 62 Turkey No 
30 Jordan No 63 UAE No 
31 Kuwait No 64 United Kingdom Yes 
32 Lithuania No 65 United States Yes 
33 Luxembourg No 66 Venezuela No 
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Table 3: Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
This table presents the Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACARs) around the 
bankruptcy announcements listed in Table 1. In the Overall case, we use all 27 bankruptcy 
announcements and equity data from all the 66 countries in Table 2. In the cases of Negative 
and Positive Surprise we use the 20 post-1998 bankruptcy announcements and equity data from 
the 61 countries with TRMI data (all countries in Table 1, excluding Cyprus, Croatia, 
Luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia). Negative Surprise equals 1 if the Cumulative Abnormal 
Sentiment (CAS) on day one-post event is negative, set to 0 otherwise. Positive Surprise equals 
1 when the CAS on day one-post event is non-negative, set to 0 otherwise. The CAS on day 
one-post event is the sum of the Abnormal Sentiment (AS) on days 0 and 1. AS is estimated by 
subtracting from the raw sentiment the average raw sentiment of trading days -10 to -2, relative 
to the event. T-stats and P-values are based on Kolari and Pynnonen (2010). 
 Overall Negative Surprise Positive Surprise 
Event window ACAR ACAR ACAR 
[-10, -1] 0.090% 0.163% -0.112% 
[-5, -1] 0.178% 0.339% 0.081% 
[-3, -1] -0.064% -0.002% -0.081% 
[-2, -1] 0.017% 0.154% -0.049% 
[0, +1] -0.331%*** -0.537%*** -0.103% 
[0, +2] -0.285%** -0.482%*** -0.046% 
[0, +3] -0.549%*** -0.868%*** -0.140% 
[0, +5] -0.445%*** -0.584%*** -0.171% 
[+1, +2] -0.130% -0.224%** -0.097% 
[+1, +3] -0.394%** -0.611%*** -0.190% 
[+1, +5] -0.290%* -0.327% -0.222%* 
[+2, +5] -0.114% -0.048% -0.069% 
[+2, +10] -0.409%** -0.491%* -0.675%** 
[+3, +5] -0.161% -0.103% -0.125% 
[+3, +10] -0.455%** -0.547%* -0.731%*** 
[+5, +10] -0.384%** -0.451%* -0.779%*** 
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01 
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Table 4: Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
This table presents Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACARs) around the 27 
bankruptcies listed in Table 1. In the Overall case we use equity data from 66 countries and in 
the developed (developing) case data from 23 (43) countries, with developed (developing) 
economies. T-stats and P-values are based on Kolari and Pynnonen (2010). 
 Overall Developing Developed 
Event window ACAR ACAR ACAR 
[-10, -1] 0.090% -0.161% 0.468%** 
[-5, -1] 0.178% 0.069% 0.343%* 
[-3, -1] -0.064% -0.141% 0.052% 
[-2, -1] 0.017% -0.040% 0.103% 
[0, +1] -0.331%*** -0.367%* -0.277%** 
[0, +2] -0.285%** -0.283%** -0.286%** 
[0, +3] -0.549%*** -0.680%*** -0.352%* 
[0, +5] -0.445%*** -0.515%** -0.341%* 
[+1, +2] -0.130% -0.109% -0.161% 
[+1, +3] -0.394%** -0.506%*** -0.227% 
[+1, +5] -0.290%* -0.340%* -0.216% 
[+2, +5] -0.114% -0.147% -0.064% 
[+2, +10] -0.409%** -0.689%*** 0.013% 
[+3, +5] -0.161% -0.231% -0.055% 
[+3, +10] -0.455%** -0.773%*** 0.023% 
[+5, +10] -0.384%** -0.668%*** 0.043% 
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01 
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Table 5: Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns+ 
This table presents Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACARs) around the bankruptcy 
announcements listed in Table 1, using equity data from countries in Table 2. In the Overall 
case, we consider all 27 bankruptcy announcements and use equity data from all 66 countries. 
In the Overall ex US case we consider all 27 bankruptcy announcements and use equity data 
from 65 countries (all except the US). In the Overall ex Lehman Brothers case we consider 26 
bankruptcy announcements (all except Lehman Brothers) and use equity data from all 66 
countries. In the Overall ex VL case we consider 25 bankruptcy announcements (all except 
Lehman Brothers & Washington Mutual bankruptcies) and use equity data from all 66 
countries. Finally, in the Overall ex VL & US case we consider 25 bankruptcy announcements 
(all except Lehman Brothers & Washington Mutual bankruptcies) and use equity data from 65 
countries (all except the US). T-stats and P-values are based on Kolari and Pynnonen (2010). 
  Overall 
Overall ex 
US 
Overall ex 
Lehman Brothers 
Overall ex 
VL 
Overall ex VL 
& US 
Event 
window 
ACAR ACAR ACAR ACAR ACAR 
[-10, -1] 0.090% 0.095% 0.221% 0.176% 0.182% 
[-5, -1] 0.178% 0.184% 0.242% 0.116% 0.118% 
[-3, -1] -0.064% -0.067% 0.018% 0.056% 0.056% 
[-2, -1] 0.017% 0.017% 0.054% 0.073% 0.074% 
[0, +1] -0.331%*** -0.342%*** -0.228%* -0.257%** -0.266%** 
[0, +2] -0.285%** -0.295%** -0.247%** -0.190%* -0.197%* 
[0, +3] -0.549%*** -0.569%*** -0.455%** -0.420%** -0.435%** 
[0, +5] -0.445%*** -0.461%*** -0.517%*** -0.493%*** -0.512%*** 
[+1, +2] -0.130% -0.136% -0.128% -0.076% -0.079% 
[+1, +3] -0.394%** -0.410%** -0.335%* -0.306% -0.317% 
[+1, +5] -0.290%* -0.301%* -0.397%** -0.379%** -0.394%** 
[+2, +5] -0.114% -0.118% -0.288%** -0.237%* -0.245%* 
[+2, +10] -0.409%** -0.423%** -0.559%** -0.349%** -0.364%** 
[+3, +5] -0.161% -0.166% -0.269%* -0.303%** -0.315%** 
[+3, +10] -0.455%** -0.470%** -0.540%** -0.416%** -0.434%** 
[+5, +10] -0.384%** -0.399%** -0.440%** -0.275%* -0.290%* 
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01 
 
 
   
+ Part of Robustness Analysis results 
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Table 6: Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns* 
This table presents the Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACARs) around the bankruptcy 
announcements listed in Table 1. In the Overall case, we use all 27 bankruptcy announcements and 
equity data from all the 66 countries in Table 2. In the cases of Negative and Positive Surprise#2 
we use the 20 post-1998 bankruptcy announcements and equity data from the 61 countries with 
TRMI data (all countries in Table 1, excluding Cyprus, Croatia, Luxembourg, Slovakia and 
Slovenia). Negative Surprise#2 equals 1 if the Cumulative Difference in Sentiment (CDS) on day 
one-post event is negative, set to 0 otherwise. Positive Surprise#2 equals 1 when CDS on day one-
post event is non-negative, set to 0 otherwise. The CDS on day one-post event is the sum of the 
Difference in Sentiment (DS) on days 0 and 1. DS is the difference of the raw Sentiment (S) of two 
consecutive days (i.e. DSt = St – St-1). T-stats and P-values are based on Kolari and Pynnonen (2010). 
 Overall Negative Surprise#2 Positive Surprise#2 
Event window ACAR ACAR ACAR 
[-10, -1] 0.090% -0.005% 0.080% 
[-5, -1] 0.178% 0.199% 0.246% 
[-3, -1] -0.064% 0.019% -0.110% 
[-2, -1] 0.017% 0.138% -0.039% 
[0, +1] -0.331%*** -0.495%*** -0.139% 
[0, +2] -0.285%** -0.417%*** -0.108% 
[0, +3] -0.549%*** -0.726%*** -0.282% 
[0, +5] -0.445%*** -0.493%** -0.266% 
[+1, +2] -0.130% -0.217%* -0.102% 
[+1, +3] -0.394%** -0.526%*** -0.276% 
[+1, +5] -0.290%* -0.293%* -0.260% 
[+2, +5] -0.114% 0.002% -0.127% 
[+2, +10] -0.409%** -0.450%** -0.727%** 
[+3, +5] -0.161% -0.076% -0.158% 
[+3, +10] -0.455%** -0.528%** -0.758%** 
[+5, +10] -0.384%** -0.495%** -0.739%** 
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01 
 
 
* Part of Robustness Analysis results 
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Table 7: Regression Analysis& 
This table presents results from OLS regression analysis estimations with the post-event 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) as the dependent variable and the post-event Cumulative 
Abnormal Sentiment (CAS) or Cumulative Difference in Sentiment (CDS) as the independent 
variables. CAR (0, x), with x spanning 0-10, is estimated by following the steps described in 
Equations (1) – (3). CAS (0, x) is estimated by summing up the post-event Abnormal Sentiment 
(AS) on days 0 to x, with x being the post-event day x, spanning 0-10. AS is estimated by 
subtracting from the raw sentiment the average raw sentiment of trading days -10 to -2, relative to 
the event. CDS (0, x) is estimated by summing up the post-event Difference in Sentiment (DS) on 
days 0 to x, with x being the post-event day x, spanning 0-10. DS is the difference of the raw 
Sentiment (S) in two consecutive days (i.e. DSt = St – St-1). We control for Bankruptcy and 
Country-specific characteristics via indicator variables and for the heteroscedasticity of the error 
terms by using White-Huber (heteroscedasticity robust) standard errors. 
Dependent Variable 𝑪𝑨𝑹(𝟎, 𝒙): 𝒙 ∈ [𝟎, 𝟏𝟎] 
Constant -0.0241*** -0.0243*** 
 (0.00366) (0.00385) 
𝑪𝑨𝑺(𝟎, 𝒙): 𝒙 ∈ [𝟎, 𝟏𝟎] 0.00927***  
 (0.000952)  
𝑪𝑫𝑺(𝟎, 𝒙): 𝒙 ∈ [𝟎, 𝟏𝟎]  0.0132*** 
  (0.00216) 
Observations 13177 13175 
Adj. R-Square 0.118 0.11 
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01 
 
 
& Part of Robustness Analysis results 
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Table 8: Regression Analysis¬ 
This table presents results from OLS regression analysis estimations with the post-event Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) as 
the dependent variable and the Negative Surprise or Negative Surprise#2 as the independent variables. CAR (0, x), with x spanning 
0-10, is estimated by following the steps described in Equations (1) – (3). Negative Surprise Indicator (NSI) equals 1 if the 
Cumulative Abnormal Sentiment (CAS) on day one-post event is negative, set to 0 otherwise. The CAS on day one-post event is 
the sum of the Abnormal Sentiment (AS) on days 0 and 1. AS is estimated by subtracting from the raw sentiment the average raw 
sentiment of trading days -10 to -2, relative to the event. Negative Surprise Indicator 2 (NSI#2) equals 1 if the Cumulative 
Difference in Sentiment (CDS) on day one-post event is negative, set to 0 otherwise. The CDS on day one-post event is the sum of 
the Difference in Sentiment (DS) on days 0 and 1. DS is the difference of the raw Sentiment (S) in two consecutive days (i.e. DSt 
= St – St-1). We control for Bankruptcy and Country-specific characteristics via indicator variables and for the heteroscedasticity of 
the error terms by using White-Huber (heteroscedasticity robust) standard errors. 
 Dependent Variable 𝑪𝑨𝑹(𝟎, 𝟏) 𝑪𝑨𝑹(𝟎, 𝟏) 𝑪𝑨𝑹(𝟎, 𝟑) 𝑪𝑨𝑹(𝟎, 𝟑) 𝑪𝑨𝑹(𝟎, 𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹(𝟎, 𝟓) 
Constant -0.00118 -0.000097 -0.00223 -0.00163 -0.0171* -0.017 
 (0.00806 (0.00841) (0.00932) (0.00974) (0.0101) (0.0105) 
NSI -0.00312**  -0.00497***  -0.00510***  
 (0.00121)  (0.00167)  (0.00187)  
NSI#2  -0.00351***  -0.00387**  -0.00331* 
  (0.0013)  (0.00176)  (0.0019) 
Observations 1198 1197 1198 1197 1198 1197 
Adj. R-Square 0.127 0.128 0.0861 0.0833 0.0982 0.0948 
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01 
 
 
¬ Part of Robustness Analysis results 
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Figure 1: Average CAR (ACAR) vs Relative Date 
This figure plots Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACARs) around bankruptcy announcements in Table 1 using equity data from 
countries in Table 2. For the Overall case, we consider all the 27 bankruptcies in Table 1 across 66 stock market indices from countries in 
Table 2. For the Surprise cases (Negative and Positive), we consider the 20 post-1998 bankruptcy announcements across the 61 countries 
with TRMI data (excluding Cyprus, Croatia, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia). A plot of 27 randomly selected dates (to match the 
number and time span of the bankruptcies in Table 1) across all 66 countries (in Table 2) is included for comparison purposes. 
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Figure 2: Average CAR (ACAR) vs Relative Date 
This figure plots Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACARs) around bankruptcy announcements in Table 1 using equity data from 
countries in Table 2. For the Overall case, we consider all the 27 bankruptcies in Table 1 across 66 stock market indices from the countries 
in Table 2. For the developed case, we consider the 27 bankruptcies across 23 countries with developed economies. Finally, for the 
Developing case, we consider the 27 bankruptcies across 43 countries with developing economies. A plot of 27 randomly selected dates 
(to match the number and time span of the bankruptcies in Table 1) across all 66 countries (in Table 2) is included for comparison purposes. 
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